Exploring the Hyperparameter Landscape of Adversarial Robustness by Duesterwald, Evelyn et al.
SafeML 2019 ICLR Workshop (May 6, 2019)
EXPLORING THE HYPERPARAMETER LANDSCAPE OF
ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
Evelyn Duesterwald
IBM Research
Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
Anupama Murthi
IBM Research
Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
Ganesh Venkataraman
IBM Research
Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
Mathieu Sinn
IBM Research Ireland
Mulhuddart, Dublin 15
Deepak Vijaykeerthy
IBM Research India
Bangalore, India
ABSTRACT
Adversarial training shows promise as an approach for training models that are
robust towards adversarial perturbation. In this paper, we explore some of the
practical challenges of adversarial training. We present a sensitivity analysis that
illustrates that the effectiveness of adversarial training hinges on the settings of a
few salient hyperparameters. We show that the robustness surface that emerges
across these salient parameters can be surprisingly complex and that therefore
no effective one-size-fits-all parameter settings exist. We then demonstrate that
we can use the same salient hyperparameters as tuning knob to navigate the ten-
sion that can arise between robustness and accuracy. Based on these findings,
we present a practical approach that leverages hyperparameter optimization tech-
niques for tuning adversarial training to maximize robustness while keeping the
loss in accuracy within a defined budget.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning continues to advance and reach or surpass human-level performance across tasks
spread over a set of modalities such as speech (Xiong et al., 2017) and computer vision (Lu &
Tang, 2015; He et al., 2015). At the same time, deep learning models are shown to be vulnerable to
adversarial examples that are designed to misguide a trained model through small and imperceptible
perturbations of the input data (Szegedy et al., 2014).
These model vulnerabilities expose a new class of security and privacy issues and spawned sig-
nificant research into how to craft these perturbations and how to train models that are robust to
them. Many of the earlier defense directions have resulted in only marginal increases in robustness
(Huang et al., 2015; Gu & Rigazio, 2014). Adversarial Training (Shaham et al., 2015; Szegedy et al.,
2014), where adversarial examples are directly incorporated into the training process, presents one
of the more promising directions that has recently shown to provide strong protections (Madry et al.,
2017).
In this paper, we look into some of the practical challenges of adversarial training. The first such
challenge is the need to adequately configure adversarial training protocols. In addition to common
training hyperparameters, adversarial training has a few new parameters that control the signifi-
cance given to adversarial perturbation during training. Our experiments show that the effectiveness
of adversarial training hinges on adequate settings of these salient parameters. As is the case for
many hyperparameters, adversarial training parameters are sensitive to both training data and net-
work characteristics and one-size-fits-all settings are generally ineffective. When exploring just how
sensitive adversarial training is to parameter settings, we discovered that the robustness surface that
results across the parameter space can be surprisingly complex, further adding to the challenge of
configuring adversarial training.
Another practical challenge results from the often observed tension between accuracy and robust-
ness (Su et al., 2018). The objective of adversarial training is to increase robustness, which is
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typically measured as the accuracy of a model’s predictions on adversarial examples. However,
these increases often come at the price of a decrease in accuracy on clean test examples. Recently,
Tsipras et al. were able to show that there, in fact, exists an inherent trade-off between accuracy
and robustness. This trade-off also manifests in our experiments where the same parameters that are
crucial to achieving robustness also tend to control the decrease in accuracy on clean test examples.
Moreover, our experiments show that we can effectively use these salient parameters as tuning knobs
to navigate the tension between robustness and accuracy. We show that by looking at adversarial
training as a multi-objective tuning problem, we can leverage existing HPO (hyperparameter op-
timization) strategies (Bergstra et al., 2011; Bergstra & Bengio; Snoek et al., 2012) to fine-tune
parameter settings for the desired accuracy-performance trade-off. In summary, the main contribu-
tions of this paper are as follows:
(i) A sensitivity analysis that provides new insights into the potentially complex relationship be-
tween robustness achievable through adversarial training and its hyperparameter settings.
(ii) A practical approach that addresses the challenges of finding effective adversarial training hy-
perparameter settings through tuning.
(iii) An experimental evaluation of our approach that demonstrates that we can leverage HPO strate-
gies to find hyperparameter settings that maximize robustness within a given accuracy budget.
The resulting tuning approach provides a degree of automation that enables practitioners to achieve
robustness without having to reason about salient parameter settings. We believe that thereby, our
approach can play an important role in making adversarial training more accessible and practical.
2 BACKGROUND
Given a deep learning model f(.; θ) and a clean input x, whose actual label is y, an adversarial
example (Szegedy et al., 2014) is an input xadv such that:
f(xadv; θ) 6= y ∧ d(x, xadv) ≤ 
Intuitively, an adversarial example xadv can be created by adding a small amount of noise to x, such
that x and xadv are close according to some distance metric d but f(xadv; θ) 6= y. In each domain,
the distance metric used varies. For instance, in the case of images various lp norms are used as they
are considered a reasonable approximation of human perceptual distance. As commonly used to
measure adversarial perturbations in images, we use l∞ norm, which is a measure of the maximum
absolute change to any pixel (worst case) (Shaham et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
Numerous techniques have been proposed for generating adversarial examples (incl. Goodfellow
et al. (2014); Kurakin et al. (2016); Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016); Papernot et al. (2016); Carlini
& Wagner (2017)). In this paper we focus on the Projected Gradient Descent method, a strong
adversary proposed by Madry et al. (2017)).
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): PGD can be interpreted as a projected gradient descent on
the negative loss function. Madry et al. (2017) demonstrate on MNIST and CIFAR-10 that models
adversarially trained with PGD exhibit robustness even against stronger white-box adversaries. This
in-turn shows that we can build resilient defense strategies against white-box attackers by develop-
ing strong white-box attacks and then adversarially retraining the models with examples from the
stronger attacks.
Adversarial Training (Goodfellow et al., 2014) refers to a training protocol with the goal to harden
a model against adversarial examples. We consider a variant of Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM)
proposed by Madry et al. (2017), where the aim is to minimize an empirical risk formulation that
incorporates adversarial perturbations:
min
θ
ρ(θ), where ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
{
max
δ∈S
L(θ;x+ δ, y)
}
In the above equation θ is the set of model parameters, S is a set of allowed perturbations and
L(θ;x, y) is the original loss function. The formulation offers a unifying perspective over the ex-
isting works in adversarial robustness. Intuitively the inner maximization problem aims to find an
adversarial example with high loss and the outer minimization problem tries to find the optimal
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model parameters such that loss due to the inner maximization problem is minimized. This is pre-
cisely the problem of training a classifier robust to the adversarial noise in the training instances.
3 ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
We conducted a series of experiments to explore the robustness that can be achieved with adversarial
training by varying hyperparameters. We used the adversarial trainer implementation from the open-
source Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) library (Nicolae et al., 2018). As proposed by Madry
et al. (2017) we use PGD to generate adversarial examples during training.
We experimented with two standard image datasets: MNIST handwritten digit recognition (Lecun
& Cortes, 1998) and SVHN street view house numbers (Netzer et al., 2011). We trained MNIST on
the LeNet-5 network (Lecun) and SVHN on ResNet-32 (He et al., 2016) since in both cases, we can
achieve high levels of accuracy when training with clean training data.
3.1 ROBUSTNESS SURFACE
We first evaluated the accuracy and robustness of our two models when trained with clean training
examples. We conducted a robustness test that measures robustness as the accuracy of the model on
adversarial examples generated using PGD. The degree of adversarial perturbation during example
generation is controlled by the parameter , which provides a bound on the maximal perturbation. In
the image domain, this means that the l∞-norm distance between original and perturbed image has
to be less than . For MNIST we configured PGD with  = 0.3 (Madry et al., 2017) and for SVHN
we used  = 0.03. The results of the robustness test show that neither model is robust, yielding only
17.6% (MNIST) and 0.4% (SVHN) accuracy on adversarial test examples, compared to 99.8% and
99.3% on their clean counterparts:
MNIST-LeNet SVHN-ResNet
Acctest = 99.8 Accadv = 17.6 Acctest = 99.3 Accadv = 0.4
We next conduct a sensitivity analysis to explore how the robustness gains that can be achieved with
adversarial training vary with changes in salient hyperparameter values. We focus on the hyperpa-
rameters that control the strength of the influence given to adversarial perturbation during training
which include the parameters ratio and :
ratio fraction of training examples in each batch to be replaced with their adversarial counterparts
 PGD attack parameter providing an l∞ upper bound on the allowed perturbation
To understand the influence of these parameters, we generated adversarially trained models for vary-
ing values of ratio and  and measured both accuracy and robustness on held-out test data. We trained
50 configurations for each data set: 5 values from the  dimension and the 10 ratio values 0.1,0.2,
.., 0.9,1. We repeated each of the 50 adversarial training runs 10 times and averaged accuracy and
robustness measurements across these 10 runs. We measured the robustness of each adversarially
trained model using the above PGD based robustness test with fixed  values ( = 0.3 for MNIST
and  = 0.03 for SVHN). Further detail on the experiment is shown in the appendix. In Figure 1 we
visualize the results in the surface plots that emerge with varying values of ratio and . We used the
python scipy.interpolate package with cubic interpolation to generate the surface plots over
a 30 x 30 grid of hyperparameters.
Comparing the two plots shows that the shape of the robustness surface is unique to each model/data
set combination as the area with the highest robustness values is located in different areas of the
parameter space in the two plots. Moreover, the surface shape itself can be surprisingly variable,
especially for the more complex ResNet-32 model, with several distinct peaks and valleys. For
MNIST we observe that for  ≥ 0.3 and ratio=1.0 the robustness of the model decreases sharply.
This can be explained by the fact that we are using a model with relatively low capacity which is
unable to achieve robustness under the strong adversarial loss in this parameter range (a phenomenon
also observed by Madry et al. (2017)). For SVHN this effect is even more pronounced. We note
that while Buckman et al. (2018) were able to adversarially train a ResNet model on SVHN with
ratio=1.0 and  = 0.047, they used a wide ResNet architecture with width factor 4 which has the
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Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis illustrating the variability of robustness (adversarial accuracy) as a
function of adversarial training parameters  and ratio.
Figure 2: Accuracy surface (blue-darker color) and robustness surface (red-lighter color) that emerge
across varying values of adversarial training parameters  and ratio.
capacity to be trained against stronger adversaries. Overall, the high degree of variability both
within and across plots suggests that one-size-fits-all parameter settings will be ineffective. In order
to achieve maximal robustness these parameters have to be custom set.
To explore the trade-off between accuracy and robustness, we plotted the accuracy surface (accuracy
on clean test examples) that emerges for the same parameter range against the robustness surface,
shown in Figure 2. Both plots (MNIST and SVHN) expose the opposing trends of robustness (red)
and accuracy (blue): accuracy tends to decrease with growing  and ratio whereas robustness tends
to increase with growing values in these two dimensions, up to a point, after which robustness also
decreases sharply for large  and ratio values. As observed earlier, the ResNet-32 architecture we
used does not provide sufficient capacity for the SVHN data set to be fitted in the presence of a
strong adversary (i.e., high  and high ratio range). However, robustness gains without significant
accuracy loss can be achieved in other areas of the parameter space. Finally, we observe that the
diagonal slope in the shape of the plots towards the high ratio and high  range indicates that both
parameters, together, influence the shape.
3.2 PARAMETER TUNING
Figure 2 illustrates the challenge of finding effective adversarial training parameter settings that hit
a sweet spot in the surface plots: maximizing robustness while minimizing the reduction in accuracy.
To address this tension, we are treating adversarial training as an optimization problem under control
of a budget. Given a user provided budget β on the allowable accuracy reduction relative to training
on clean examples, the goal is to maximize robustness while keeping the accuracy reduction within
budget β. Specifically, if Accf is the accuracy that is achieved on a test set Xtest when training on
4
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clean data, and Accf ′ is the accuracy achieved when training adversarially, the allowable accuracy
reduction has to stay within budget β:
Accf ′(Xtest) > ( Accf (Xtest)− β )
To solve this problem, we leverage hyperparameter optimization (HPO) techniques (Bergstra et al.,
2011; Bergstra & Bengio; Snoek et al., 2012). To account for the accuracy budget β we use β as a
filter to rule out unacceptable solutions during HPO.
We experimented with the following HPO strategies: (i) grid search, (ii) random search, and (iii)
Tree-structured Parzen Estimator (TPE) Bergstra et al. (2011). Grid search systematically explores a
uniformly sampled subspace of the optimization space and returns the parameter setting for the best
performing exploration. Random search randomly samples the optimization space and returns the
best performing parameter setting. TPE follows a Sequential Model-Based Optimization approach
to sequentially construct models that approximate the performance of hyperparameters based on
previous measurements.
To adapt grid and random search to account for the accuracy budget β we use β as a filter to reject so-
lutions with unacceptable accuracy reduction. We adapt TPE by first running TPE unmodified while
saving the results of all explored parameter settings. When TPE completes, we apply β as a filter
to eliminate solutions with unacceptable accuracy loss and return the most robust solution among
the remaining parameter settings. Note that, for small β values there may not exist an adversarially
trained model that falls within that accuracy budget.
Our first set of tuning experiments evaluates the effectiveness of the three HPO techniques in finding
optimal parameter settings for  and ratio without an accuracy budget constraint. We split off a 12K
validation set to be used for tuning, and kept aside a 10K test set for MNIST and a 26K test set
for SVHN. Each HPO strategy explores the parameter space at a granularity of 30 x 30 points. We
ran 100 experiments for each HPO strategy, where in experiment i we ran each strategy for up to
i iterations (i.e., i explored configurations). Figure 3 shows the achieved robustness for the three
HPO techniques. Since both random search and TPE include random exploration we repeated each
random and TPE experiment 40 times and report in Figure 3 the average robustness achieved among
the 40 repetitions.
Figure 3 shows that overall TPE is more effective at finding higher performing configurations in
fewer iterations compared to grid and random search, except at low iteration counts, where random
search performs best (especially for SVHN). Grid search performance does not grow monotonically
with iterations and can be erratic due to the uniform sampling approach (the i points sampled at
iteration i may not be included during iteration i + 1). Thus, while random and grid search share
the same cost, random search delivers more consistent results. The cost of TPE is slightly higher
since in between iterations TPE updates and applies a surrogate model. However, the costs of these
inter-iteration steps are negligible compared to the cost of exploring a parameter configuration.
All three strategies return values close to their optimum after about 50 iterations. After that point
there are diminishing gains from running more iterations. In the following table we show the
strongest results achieved at iteration i = 50, which were found by grid search:
Grid n = 50 ratio  Accadv Acctest Grid n = 50 ratio  Accadv Acctest
MNIST 0.86 0.49 93.4 97.4 SVHN 0.48 0.049 40.0 70.9
The most robust configuration that is found for MNIST achieves strong robustness at 93.4%. In the
case of the more complex SVHN robustness surface, grid search was able to find one of the peaks
in Figure 1 (coordinates (ratio=0.48,=0.049)), while staying clear of the area with deep robustness
declines. However, this particular peak also results in a steep accuracy reduction (70.9% compared
to 99.3% for clean training).
Our next experiment explores how the inclusion of an accuracy budget can improve the tuning pro-
cess by avoiding configurations with steep accuracy declines. We repeated the HPO experiments
for a fixed iteration count of 50 and this time incorporated an accuracy budget β. Figure 4 shows
the results of this experiment for a selection of accuracy budgets β. For each value of β, the top
charts show the robustness that can be achieved under the respective accuracy budget. As in Fig-
ure 3, we repeated each random and TPE experiment 40 times and report the average adversarial
5
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Figure 3: Robustness achieved on the test set by grid, random search and TPE. Each random search
and TPE point is averaged across 40 runs. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4: Robustness achieved on the test set by various HPO techniques after 50 iterations shown
for a selection of accuracy budgets β.
accuracy achieved. The rightmost group of bars refers to the unbounded scenario with no accuracy
budget. Since MNIST is relatively easily trained robustly, we consider very tight accuracy budgets
for MNIST.
We show the results achieved for grid search below:
β = 1.6% β = 14.0%
Grid n = 50 ratio  Accadv Acctest Grid n = 50 ratio  Accadv Acctest
MNIST 0.49 0.22 92.7 98.01 SVHN 0.22 0.032 38.3 85.6
For MNIST, with β = 1.6% grid search finds a configuration that achieves robustness close to the
unbounded case (92.7% compared to 93.4%) with a smaller loss in accuracy. The trade-off is more
interesting for SVHN where with β = 14%, grid search finds a different peak in Figure 1 at coor-
dinates (ratio=0.22, =0.032) with a much lower ratio value, located in high accuracy range. The
robustness is close to the robustness found with no accuracy budget (38.3% compared to 40.0%) but
accuracy is significantly higher at 85.6% compared to 70.9%. Thus, with inclusion of an accuracy
budget, the HPO techniques manage to find the sweet spot in the accuracy/robustness trade-off, even
when run on a surface as complex as for SVHN.
The bottom charts illustrate the success rate of finding configurations that fall within the accuracy
budget. For very small budgets β, random search and TPE may not always find a configuration
during the 40 repetitions of the experiment. Thus, under very tight accuracy budgets, tuning with
random or TPE should be repeated several times to increase the likelihood that a solution under very
tight accuracy reduction bounds can be found.
Overall, we can see that the trends in the bar charts reflect the accuracy/robustness trade-off; in-
creases in robustness come at the price of a higher accuracy reductions. Importantly, the charts
show that when adapting HPO search with an accuracy budget, we can effectively navigate this
trade-off and find a satisfactory solution for a given accuracy loss tolerance.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the sensitivity of adversarial training to its salient hyperparameters. Our
experiments show that the relationship between robustness and accuracy on the one hand, and adver-
sarial training hyperparameter, on the other, can be surprisingly complex. We devised an approach
that addresses this complexity by leveraging HPO strategies to achieve maximal robustness within a
given accuracy budget without having to reason about salient hyperparameter values. Motivated by
our results thus far we are planning to continue the exploration of the robustness surface for larger
networks and tuning with additional hyperparameters. We hope that by offering a principled, auto-
mated approach we can contribute to making robust training protocols more accessible and practical.
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Appendix
Keras LeNet-5 and ResNet-32 models were trained using the IBM Watson Machine Learning ser-
vice (WML) with NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPUs for the smaller LeNet-5 jobs and P100 GPUs for the
ResNet-32 training jobs. Hyperparameter settings include for MNIST-LeNet-5: batch size = 50,
num epochs = 83 and for SVHN: batch size = 150, num epochs = 83. PGD was configured to run
up to 40 iterations with an epsilon step size of 0.01 for MNIST and 0.007 for SVHN.
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